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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20130281
JOHN E. HUMMEL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a. Issue: Does the evidence presented at trial support the verdicts on an
extortion theory?
Standard of Review: While appellate courts view the facts in a light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah App.1994),
cert. denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), where the issue on appeal is whether the facts
proved at trial establish the offense charged, the question of whether or not the trial court
correctly interpreted the relevant statute is one of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Winward, 907 P.2d 1188 (Utah App.1995).

b. Issue: Does the evidence presented at trial support the verdicts on a
deception theory?
Standard of Review: Where the issue on appeal is whether the facts
proved at trial establish the offense charged, the question of whether or not the trial court
correctly interpreted the relevant statute is one of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Winward, supra.
c. Issue: Did the trial court err in not requiring the jury to unanimously
agree upon each element of the offenses charged in Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5?
Standard of Review: This involves the interpretation of Article I, section
10 of the Utah Constitution, a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶ 3, 268 P.3d 822, 824.
d. Issue: Where the case was submitted on instructions that allowed the
jury to return a guilty verdict without indicating which of two alternative theories the
verdict was based, can the verdict be sustained if the evidence does not support a verdict
under both of the alternative theories?
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Bosh, 2011 UT 60, ¶ 5, 266 P.3d 788.
e. Issue: Was Defendant denied due process by reason of the State’s
failure to identify the misconduct it would ultimately rely upon in seeking Defendant’s
conviction and by reason of the prosecutor’s misconduct?
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Standard of Review: This involves the interpretation of Article I, section
12 of the Utah Constitution, a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Garcia,
2010 UT App 196, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 853, 855.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The texts of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-405, 76-6-406, and 77-32-202; and
Utah Constitution, Article I, sections 10 and 12, are set out in ADDENDUM A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for
Garfield County, the Honorable James R. Taylor presiding. The appeal is taken from the
judgment of conviction and sentence and the order denying Defendant’s motion to arrest
judgment and motion for new trial.

Proceedings in the Lower Court. Defendant John E. Hummel was tried on the
following charges: Count 1: THEFT BY EXTORTION / alternatively, THEFT BY
DECEPTION, 2nd Degree Felony; Count 2: THEFT BY EXTORTION / alternatively,
THEFT BY DECEPTION, 2nd Degree Felony; Count 3: THEFT BY DECEPTION, 2nd
Degree Felony; Count 4: THEFT BY EXTORTION / alternatively, THEFT BY
DECEPTION, 3rd Degree Felony; and Count 5: ATTEMPTED THEFT BY
EXTORTION / alternatively, ATTEMPTED THEFT BY DECEPTION, 3rd Degree
Felony. R 162-164. The jury found the Defendant guilty on all counts, without
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identifying which of the alternative theories it had relied upon in returning verdicts on
Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. R 333-334. See ADDENDUM B.

Disposition in the Trial Court. On March 15, 2013, the district court denied
Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment and motion for new trial and imposed the
following sentence: Defendant was ordered to serve one to 15 years in the Utah State
Prison and pay the maximum fine and surcharge on each of the second degree felony
convictions (Counts 1, 2, and 3) and to serve a term not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison and pay the maximum fine and surcharge on each of the third degree felony
convictions (Counts 4 and 5). These sentences were to be served concurrently. The court
stayed the execution of these sentences and placed Defendant on supervised probation for
a period of 36 months upon terms and conditions which included a term of 90 days in the
Garfield County Jail. R 406-409.

Statement of Facts. The charges against the Defendant were based upon the theory that,
while under contract to provide legal representation for indigent persons who were
charged with criminal offenses in Garfield County, Defendant obtained or attempted to
obtain money or personal property from persons whom the Defendant was contractually
obligated to represent free of charge and that the Defendant accomplished or attempted to
accomplish this either by threat or by deceit. The evidence that the State offered in
support of each charge is considered in the chronological order in which the various
offenses were allegedly committed. Because this case involves conduct allegedly
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undertaken by the Defendant while he was representing individuals who were defendants
in criminal proceedings in the Sixth District Court, the Defendant is, at times hereafter,
referred to by his surname in order to avoid confusing Mr. Hummel with persons he
represented as criminal defendants.

GERARDO CALLIES — COUNT 2
At the preliminary hearing conducted in the instant case, the State
introduced the written out-of-court statement of Gerardo “Jerry” Callies in which Callies
stated that on or about July 30, 2008, he had been charged in the Sixth District Court with
various misdemeanors, including Reckless Endangerment and Domestic Violence in the
Presence of a Child. R 466-467. Callies’ statement included the following allegations:
Thereafter, I filed with the Court an affidavit of indigency for
the appointment of a public defender.
On or about August 7, 2008, the Court appointed John
Hummel as a public defender to represent me. At that time,
Mr. Hummel took me into a room and explained that if I hired
him privately, he could get me out of jail that day. Otherwise,
I would spend an additional thirty (30) days in jail and that the
police wanted several felony charges filed against me, over
and above what had already been charged.
R 466.
During the trial it became apparent that Hummel had never been appointed
to represent Callies and that Callies’ application for a public defender clearly indicated
that he did not qualify for appointed counsel. At the trial, the State’s prosecutor handed
Callies a copy of the application for court-appointed counsel that Callies had submitted to
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the district court on August 7, 2008. R 461, at 77-79; State’s Exhibit 20. Callies
identified the document and testified that he had filled it out in the courtroom and that he
and Hummel had both signed it. Whereupon, the prosecutor offered State’s Exhibit 20.
R 461, at 78-79.
Defense counsel requested permission to question Callies on voir dire,
following which the prosecutor stipulated that the signature to which Callies had referred
was not that of the Defendant, but was the signature of Garfield County Attorney Barry
Huntington. R 461, at 79-81. Huntington had signed the prosecutor’s certificate
certifying that he had read Callies’ application and had concluded that the public defender
“should not be appointed.” R 461, at 81-83; State’s Exhibit 20.
At this point in time, there was a fundamental shift in the theory of how the
Defendant had purportedly victimized Callies. Now Callies claimed that Exhibit 20 was
not the affidavit that he had initially filled out and handed to the bailiff and claimed that it
was actually a second affidavit that Hummel had produced from his bag and had asked
Callies to fill out. R 461, at 83-84. The prosecutor then went on to elicit testimony from
Callies to the effect that Callies did not know what had happened to the first affidavit but
that he “thought” he had reported his annual income as $29,000 on that affidavit and that
he had overreported his income on the affidavit that had actually been filed with the court
“[b]ecause I had Mr. Hummel sitting right next to me pressuring me.” R 461, at 103-104.
Q. [BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] How was -- I
mean, how was he pressuring you?
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A. [BY MR. CALLIES] He was talking about my company,
the shop, you know.
Q. Was he -- was he instructing you on -- on what number
you should fill in there?
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. He’s leading the witness.
THE COURT: You are.
Q. (By Mr. Garrett) Did he say anything to you about filling
out the affidavit?
A. He was too busy -- interested in the company, what its
assets were.
R 461, at 104.
Under cross-examination, Callies conceded that Hummel had not suggested
what he should write while filling out Exhibit 20. R 461, at 157-158.
On the next day of the trial, the State’s investigator, Deputy Eric Houston,
testified that “probably four weeks” before the trial, the State’s prosecutor, in a meeting
with Deputy Houston and Mr. Callies, had shown Houston the document that would later
be received as State’s Exhibit 20 and had pointed out the fact that County Attorney
Huntington had signed the prosecutor’s certification indicating that in his opinion Callies
did not qualify for appointed counsel. R 462, at 189-191. Houston conceded that he was
“surprised” by this revelation. R 462, at 191-192. After which, the following exchange
took place:
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Okay. Now, and you were
surprised because it was the first indication, from looking at
an actual document from the court file, that suggested maybe
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Mr. Callies hadn’t ever been appointed a public defender,
correct?
A. [BY DEPUTY HOUSTON] That’d be correct.
Q. All right.
A. I guess to me, yes.
Q. Okay. And do you recall -- it may have been this week,
earlier this week after the start of the trial?
A. No. I believe I saw it before the trial started.
Q. Okay. Now, having seen that now for the first time, this
document that indicated that the county attorney himself had
apparently disapproved the appointment, what did you do
then? How did you follow up? How did you advance your
investigation?
A. I haven’t furthered my investigation into Mr. Callies at
this point.
Q. Well, you just said that you may have seen it in the
presence of Mr. Callies and Mr. Garrett, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So -- I’m just assuming that if you see this document -and it’s a shocker. It is, isn’t it?
A. I guess it doesn’t change my mind that Mr. Callies was
taken advantage of.
Q. Okay. That’s not my question. My question is when you
saw that, it was a fundamental problem that you had to deal
with in your investigation, correct?
A. It surprised me when I saw it, yes.
Q. You knew you had to deal with it.
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A. I guess.
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Callies about it?
A. We’ve spoken with him about it, yes.
Q. Was that on Monday morning?
A. Probably Sunday night, Monday morning.
Q. Was it on Tuesday morning? Could it have been Tuesday
morning?
A. The days are starting to run together.
Q. Yes, they are. My point is this, Officer, I’m not trying to
embarrass you. I just want to know how the investigation
came together and whether or not you talked to Mr. Callies
about that affidavit and what you had discovered about that
affidavit.
A. I discovered that he wrote $290,000 down. That’s -Q. Well, and you also discovered that the county attorney had
reviewed it, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And that he had disapproved the appointment of a
public defender for Mr. Callies?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, once you knew that, surely, surely you talked
to Mr. Callies, didn’t you?
A. I’ve spoken to Mr. Callies several times.
Q. Did you ask -A. Have I changed my mind about anything? No, I have not.
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Q. No, I’m not asking you about changing your mind. I’m
asking you a specific question. Did you look at that and say,
“I need to get to the bottom of this.” And go to Mr. Callies
and say, “How do we explain this? The county attorney
denied you the appointment of a public defender.”
A. I guess me and Scott [the State’s prosecutor] talked about
it and -Q. Well, I don’t -- I don’t want you to guess.
A. I still feel like Mr. Callies had been taken advantage of.
Q. Listen, I don’t want you to guess.
A. Guess at what?
Q. I think you said, “I guess me and Scott talked about it.”
A. All right. Scott and I did talk about it.
Q. All right. And then did you talk to Mr. Callies about it
and ask him for an explanation of it?
A. Yes.
Q. And when was the first time that you talked to him and
asked him for an explanation of it?
A. Sometime this week, I guess.
Q. Okay. Sometime after this trial had started, wasn’t it?
A. It would have been Sunday probably. In one of the days.
Q. All right. Within the last week anyway. Now, Mr. Callies
came to court, and you heard his testimony. And for the first
time ever from this witness stand, he claimed to have filled
out two affidavits, correct?
A. Correct.
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Q. When was the first time you heard him advance such a
theory?
A. On the stand.
R 462, at 192-196.
Jennifer Miller, the clerk of the district court, testified that jail personnel
typically provided incarcerated defendants forms for applying for the public defender and
that, to the best of her recollection, Callies had the document that was later received as
State’s Exhibit 20 in his possession when he arrived at court on August 7, 2008, that the
document was already filled out, and that it was handed to the Garfield County Attorney
for review. R 463, at 51-52.
While the minute entry made on August 7, 2008, indicated that Hummel
had been appointed to represent Callies (R 463, at 54; State’s Exhibit 5), the audio record
of the proceedings in Callies’ case, all of which was played in open court, contain nothing
indicating that Judge Lee had appointed Hummel to represent Callies. R 461, at 166-186.
See ADDENDUM C. Moreover, Miller, who had been the in-court clerk on August 7, 2008,
and had made the minute entry, testified that she had recently reviewed the audio record
of the proceedings in the Callies case and conceded that she had heard nothing in the
audio record indicating that Judge Lee had in fact appointed Hummel to represent Callies.
R 463, at 59-62.
County Attorney Huntington testified that he had checked the box on
Callies’s application indicating the public defender “should not be appointed” because
Callies’ application stated that he had an annual income of $290,000. R 463, at 103-104.
11

The State’s prosecutor then had Huntington examine the minutes from the Callies case
(State’s Exhibit 5) and elicited the following testimony suggesting that Hummel had
actually been appointed to represent Callies:
Q. [BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] Now, have you
ever -- in the course of dealing with these applications, has
there ever been a case where you made a recommendation to
the Court and then the Court didn’t follow it?
A. [BY MR. HUNTINGTON] Yeah, it happens. When -- if
the judge starts to question the witness, he’ll -- sometimes he
disagrees with me and appoints a public defender, even
though I am recommending not to, yes.
Q. Okay. And do you know in this case whether or not
counsel was appointed in Mr. Callies’ case?
A. I’m not sure, honestly.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with -- let me show you State’s
Exhibit Number 5 and ask you if you recognize this document
or are familiar with that type of document.
***
Q. (BY MR. GARRETT) What is that document?
A. These are court documents, and just stating what persons
are charged with, who the judge is, who the parties are, things
like that.
Q. And is there an entry in there as to whether or not counsel
was appointed in this case? Can you just take a minute and
review that?
A. Yeah, just a minute. Let me see. There was an affidavit.
***
A. Yes, sir. Affidavit was received. It says, “Appointment
of Counsel.[“] “The Court finds indigent -- the defendant
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indigent and appoints John Hummel to represent the
defendant.”
Q. Okay. And so would this be an instance where you made
one recommendation and the Court apparently went a
different direction?
A. Yes.
R 463, at 105-106.
In the course of the cross-examination of County Attorney Huntington, the
court took an early noon recess in the interest of affording Huntington an opportunity to
review the audio record of the Callies proceedings. R 463, at 135-138. When the court
reconvened, Huntington testified that he had listened to the above-mentioned proceedings
and conceded that he had not heard anything in the audio record which indicated that
Judge Lee had ever found Callies indigent or had appointed Hummel to represent him. R
464, at 3-4.
Callies’ case had been assigned to Judge David Mower. R 463, at 42;
State’s Exhibit 5. Judge Mower was out of the state when Callies was brought before the
court on August 7, 2008, and Judge Lee was handling Judge Mower’s criminal motion
calendar. R 462, at 238-239; R 463, at 49, 60. Judge Lee had served as Callies’ L.D.S.
bishop and stated on the record that he would not be willing to enter any order in Callies’
case unless it was by stipulation of the parties. R 461, at 167; R 462, at 239; R 463, at 49,
60, 65-66. The next criminal motion calendar was scheduled for August 21, 2008, and it
was Judge Lee’s calendar. R 463, at 65. Judge Mower was not scheduled to conduct
another criminal calendar until September 4, 2008. R 463, at 66. Court Clerk Miller
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conceded that if no stipulation had been reached between the parties, the case would not
have been considered by Judge Mower for almost a month. R 463, at 66-67.
Hummel represented Callies as retained counsel and negotiated a resolution
of the criminal charges, Callies’ immediate release from incarceration, and the
modification of a protective order that had been issued by Judge Paul Lyman in a
collateral proceeding. R 461, at 166-186. The only thing Hummel actually received in
exchange for his private representation of Mr. Callies was the SKS rifle that Callies had
used in the course of the commission of his offense. R 461, at 18-19; State’s Exhibit 8.
The firearm was released by the sheriff’s office directly to Hummel. R 461, at 19.
Callies never made a complaint about Hummel’s representation or the fact
that he had compensated Hummel for the services rendered until nearly 33 months after
Callies’ case had been resolved when he was approached by Deputy Houston who was
operating under the mistaken belief that the court had appointed Hummel to represent
Callies as the public defender. R 461, at 117.

JOHN STANFORD BURKE – COUNT 4
At the preliminary hearing, the State introduced the written out-of-court
statement of John Burke which asserted that on or about August 6, 2008, Burke had been
arrested for and charged with four felonies and three misdemeanors. R 469-470. Burke’s
statement included the following allegations:
At some point during the court process, I filed with the Court
an affidavit of indigency and was approved for the
appointment of a public defender. The judge advised me that
14

I qualified for the appointment of a public defender and
appointed John Hummel to represent me.
Thereafter, I met in a room at the courthouse with Mr.
Hummel to discuss my case. At that meeting, Mr. Hummel
advised me that he could represent me better if I hired him
privately, instead of having him appointed as a public
defender. Mr. Hummel stated that his fee would be $5,000.
Further, Mr. Hummel indicated that he would try to have the
case moved to Federal Court which would benefit me. I told
Mr. Hummel that I did not have $5,000 at that time, but I
agreed to pay $2,500 immediately and then the balance at the
conclusion of the case.
I was confused about the fact that I had to pay money as Mr.
Hummel had been appointed to represent me as a public
defender. Because I was indigent, I did not believe that I had
to pay for Mr. Hummel’s services. Nevertheless, due to
representations made to me by Mr. Hummel, and the fact that
he stated he would do a better job if retained privately, my
father agreed to pay the amount of $2,500 for Mr. Hummel’s
representation on my behalf, and he did so with a credit card.
R 469.
The evidence presented at trial established that Burke initially appeared
before the district court on January 8, 2009. R 461, at 244-245. He had not been
arrested, but appeared on summons. R 461, at 237. When the audio recordings of the
proceedings of that date were played during the trial of the instant case, it was apparent
that when Burke’s case was initially called, Burke expressed a desire to apply for a courtappointed attorney and was given an application to fill out. R 461, at 248-249. When his
case was recalled later that day, Burke appeared with County Attorney Huntington who
advised Judge Lee that Burke wanted to see if he could retain counsel. R 461, at 251252. Huntington told Judge Lee that Burke had agreed to return on February 5, 2009. R
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461, at 251. At the conclusion of Burke’s initial appearance, County Attorney
Huntington advised the court that Burke was a candidate for federal prosecution and that
Huntington was going to contact the United States Attorney’s Office to see if they were
“interested as well.” R 461, at 252, 254-255, 281; R 464, at 8-10. Defendant Hummel
did not appear as counsel for Burke at the hearing conducted on January 8, 2009. R 461,
at 246-252 (ADDENDUM D); R 464, at 8-10.
Burke initially testified that he had retained Hummel on January 8, 2009. R
461, at 250-251. Following cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited testimony from
Burke suggesting that he might have retained Hummel on February 5, 2009. R 461, at
281-283. Ultimately, Burke conceded that he did not know if he had even talked to
Hummel on January 8th. R 461, at 282-283.
When Burke’s case was first called on the February 5th calendar Hummel
had already been retained. Hummel appeared and advised the court that he would be
representing Burke. R 464, at 11, 13-14. Burke retained Hummel after Burke had
become aware of the fact that there was a possibility that he might be facing a federal
firearms charge. Burke testified that part of his reason for retaining Hummel was for
representation in the event the case ended up in federal court. R 461, at 223, 256. Burke
testified that he had decided to retain Hummel because Hummel “said he could better
represent me if we hired him, that he’ll try to get the case moved, because of the federal
charges, down into where he was an attorney at, I think St. George or Cedar, one of
those.” R 461, at 223. Burke knew that Hummel was not a federal public defender. R
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461, at 256; R 458, at 33. He understood that Hummel was under an obligation to defend
Burke in federal court in the event charges were filed in that court, not because Hummel
was a public defender, but because Burke had retained him. R 461, at 255-256.
Obviously, the specter of a federal firearms charge was not just a product of
someone’s overactive imagination. While nothing happened in the state prosecution for
14 months, the FBI was indeed investigating Burke. R 461, at 261. Burke testified that
FBI agents went to his father’s residence in Las Vegas, Nevada, and seized the shotgun
which Burke, a convicted felon, had allegedly illegally possessed in Garfield County. R
461, at 226.
After he was retained, Hummel requested that Burke’s state case be
scheduled for preliminary hearing and it was calendared for March 5, 2009. R 464, at 14;
State’s Exhibit 11. On February 19, 2009, the county attorney filed a stipulated motion to
continue the preliminary hearing and it was rescheduled for April 2, 2009. R 464, at 1415. On March 18, 2009, the preliminary hearing was continued when the court vacated
its entire April 2nd calendar. R 464, at 14-15. After some 14 months, the case was
scheduled for a status hearing to be conducted on June 24, 2010, and notice of the hearing
was sent on May 24, 2010. R 464, at 14-15.
When Burke appeared at the status hearing without Hummel, the court
appointed Dale Sessions to represent Burke. R 464, at 18-19. This was the first and only
order the court made regarding the appointment of counsel in Burke’s case. R 464, at 19;
State’s Exhibit 11. Following Sessions’ appointment, Burke’s case was immediately
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resolved with a plea to one misdemeanor because, according to County Attorney
Huntington, Burke had not gotten into any trouble in the intervening months. R 464, at
19-21. By then the federal authorities had apparently lost interest in Mr. Burke.
Later that same day, June 24, 2010, Burke went to the Garfield County
Attorney’s office and signed the written statement which ultimately became the catalyst
for Deputy Houston’s investigation of the Defendant. R 461, at 266-269; Defendant’s
Exhibit 32.

SCOTTY HARVILLE AND JOE SANDBERG -- COUNTS 1 AND 5
Scotty Harville and Joe Sandberg were charged with several offenses,
including Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a 3rd Degree Felony.
Their arrests followed a traffic stop of a vehicle which Sandberg was driving and in
which Harville was a passenger. R 460, at 43, 46. Harville and Sandberg testified that
they appeared before Judge Lee on February 5, 2009. R 460, at 20-21; R 462, at 107-108.
They were in custody. R 460, at 20-21; R 462, at 107. Harville and Sandberg testified
that their combined annual income was less than $10,000. R 461, at 202-205; R 462, at
111. They both testified that Judge Lee determined that they were eligible for the
appointment of the public defender and instructed them to meet with Hummel. R 460, at
23; R 462, at 114-115.
Harville testified that Hummel told Harville and Sandberg that they were
eligible for a public defender, but that they “would be better off if we . . . it would look
better for us if we had him as our lawyer” and that they would “have a better chance of
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getting out [of jail] that day.” “You know, it was just better if we had him as an attorney,
as our private counsel.” R 460, at 24-25.
Regarding Hummel’s suggestion that they would have a “better chance”
with retained counsel, Sandberg testified that Hummel “said that he could pretty well
guarantee that we could get out that day if we hired him as a private attorney versus being
a public defender” and that “he wasn’t sure what kind of deal he could make” as a public
defender. R 462, at 116. Sandberg further testified that he retained Hummel “in the
interim” and signed a promissory note “in order to make it seem as though we had
retained him as private counsel.” R 462, at 117.1
Harville and Sandberg testified that each of them signed a promissory note
in the amount of $5,000. R 461, at 210-211; R 462, at 117-118. They both testified that
Hummel had assured them that he would not demand payment of the promissory notes,
nor send the notes to collection. R 460, at 31; R 462, at 117. Harville and Sandberg both
testified that, in fact, Hummel had never done anything to enforce any promissory note
signed by Harville or Sandberg. R 462, at 92; R 462, at 154.
Regarding the firearms that Harville and Sandberg had been charged with
illegally possessing, Harville testified that Hummel told him: “I should probably sign
over my firearms to him so that -- as a retainer, so that way I wouldn’t be able to face
further charges.” R 460, at 29. He further testified that Hummel told him: “If I

1

During the preliminary hearing, Harville and Sandberg explained that they had signed the
promissory notes for the sake of appearance, to make it appear that they had the financial
wherewithal to mount a defense. See R 52, at 72-73, 78-80.
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maintained possession of the firearms, that I could face additional federal charges” and
that “if I signed over the firearms, then that would eliminate and take that out of play.” R
460, at 37. Harville testified that he did not recall Hummel presenting “any other options
of who might be able to receive [Harville’s] firearms instead of [Hummel]” in order to
avoid firearms charges in the future. R 460, at 37.
Hummel prepared a bill of sale transferring the firearms that had been
seized by the police and Harville signed it. R 460, at 30; State’s Exhibit 2. Hummel took
possession of these weapons by obtaining a letter of authorization from the Garfield
County Attorney, which he then presented to the Garfield County Sheriff’s Office along
with Harville’s bill of sale. R 461, at 29-30; State’s Exhibit 4.
The testimony up to this point was substantially in line with the theory of
the case which had been advanced at the preliminary hearing. See R 52, at 71-72, 75, 80;
R 466-477.

During cross-examination, Harville and Sandberg were afforded an
opportunity to listen to the audio record of the proceedings conducted in their cases on
February 5, 2009. These proceedings were played in their entirety. See R 462, at 83-90
(ADDENDUM E); R 462, at 133-145. It is clear, beyond question that there is nothing in
the audio record of the proceedings of February 5th suggesting that Judge Lee had
appointed Hummel to represent Harville or Sandberg. See R 462, at 83-90, 133-145; R
463, at 37-39. Moreover, the minute entries do not reflect that Hummel was ever
appointed to represent these individuals. See State’s Exhibits 1 and 12.
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On cross-examination, Harville and Sandberg testified that while consulting
with Hummel, they told Hummel that Sandberg owned an interest in a ranch. R 461, at
209-210; R 462, at 152-153. Indeed, at all times relevant to these proceedings, Sandberg
owned a one-sixth interest in Sandberg Ranch, Inc. R 462, at 116, 150. That corporation
owns a 400-acre ranch in Johns Valley. R 460, at 45-46; R 462, at 112. Joe Sandberg’s
interest in the corporation is represented by 5000 shares of stock which, according to
Sandberg, have been appraised at $32 per share. R 462, at 112-113, 151. According to
Sandberg, there was some restriction on his right to sell his shares to persons outside of
the family (R 462, at 113, 150-151), and in filling out his application for court-appointed
counsel, Sandberg had indicated that he had no assets of any kind. R 462, at 149-152.
After Harville and Sandberg retained him, Hummel removed their
applications for court-appointed counsel from the clerk’s workbench without first
advising the clerk that he was withdrawing their applications. This action on Hummel’s
part became a source of some considerable upset to the clerk of the court when she was
unable to locate the applications. R 462, at 328-235.
During the four years intervening between Hummel’s representation of
Harville and Sandberg and the trial in the instant case, Hummel never did anything to
enforce any promissory note signed by Harville or Sandberg. R 462, at 92; R 462, at 154.
Neither Harville nor Sandberg made any complaint about Hummel until Deputy Houston
approached them years later and told them that Hummel had been appointed to represent
them as the public defender. R 460, at 51.
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Once it had became apparent that Hummel had never been appointed to
represent Harville or Sandberg, the State’s focus shifted to the theory that Hummel had
“manipulated the system” in order to deny the court an opportunity to consider their
applications for court-appointed counsel. Indeed, this would became the State’s principle
theory of Hummel’s wrongdoing. See R 458, at 235-236. The prosecutor further argued
that part of “this pattern of manipulation” involved advising Harville “that he could face
federal charges -- federal firearm charges if he didn’t get rid of his guns.” R 458, at 238.

JOHN SPENCER -- COUNT 3
While driving a motor vehicle on October 4, 2008, John Spencer left his
lane and struck an oncoming vehicle head on. R 462, at 36. He and his wife, who was a
passenger in his vehicle, were transported to the Garfield County Memorial Hospital
where it was determined that Spencer’s blood-alcohol level was over the legal limit. R
462, at 36, 53. He was not arrested because he required immediate surgery. R 462, at 37,
55. When he thereafter failed to contact the court, he was arrested on a warrant and
charged with Driving Under the Influence with Injury, a class A misdemeanor. R 462, at
40-41, 55-56; R 464, at 32. When he appeared before Judge Lee on February 5, 2009, he
was free on bail. R 462, at 56-57.
Spencer was unemployed and relying upon his parents for financial support.
R 462, at 44-45. He requested a public defender. R 462, at 41. Spencer testified that
Judge Lee gave him an application for a court-appointed attorney and instructed him to
talk to Mr. Hummel. R 462, at 42-43. He filled out the application. R 462, at 42.
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Spencer testified that he had a discussion with Hummel during which
Hummel asked him if he had “any collateral for private counsel.” R 462, at 43, 58.
Spencer testified that he told Hummel that he had “a couple guns.” R 462, at 43. Spencer
had not listed these firearms in his indigency affidavit. R 52, at 88. Hummel agreed to
represent Spencer in exchange for three firearms which Spencer valued at approximately
$700. R 462, at 44, 63-64.
While there is a minute entry in Spencer’s case which states that Hummel
had been appointed to represent Mr. Spencer (State’s Exhibit 9), the audio records of the
proceedings contain nothing indicating that Hummel had been appointed. R 462, at 3942; R 463, at 67-69.
After agreeing to represent Spencer, Hummel negotiated the reduction of
the charge to a class B misdemeanor and procured a concession that allowed Spencer to
avoid spending any more time in jail. R 462, at 48-49. After court, Hummel drove to
Spencer’s home, took possession of the firearms, and gave Spencer a receipt for the
weapons. R 462, at 49-52; State’s Exhibit 10. During the 30 months that intervened
between the resolution of his case and his being contacted by Deputy Houston, Spencer
had never complained to anyone about Hummel’s representation or the fact that he had
compensated Hummel for the legal services rendered.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence does not support convictions under an extortion theory as
there is no evidence that Hummel threatened to subject any person to physical
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confinement or threatened to “withhold official action.” The evidence does not support
convictions under a deception theory as the evidence does not support a finding that
Hummel deceived the alleged victims. The district court erred in submitting Counts 1, 2,
4, and 5 to the jury on alternative theories of criminal responsibility without requiring
unanimous agreement as to whether Hummel had threatened or had deceived the alleged
victims. Even if there was no error in not requiring jury unanimity, it is clear that in order
to sustain these verdicts, the evidence must support each verdict under both alternative
theories. Hummel was denied due process of law in that he was not provided sufficient
information so as to allow him to adequately prepare his defense because the nature of his
alleged misconduct was constantly changing throughout the entire proceedings. Finally,
Defendant was denied due process of law by the prosecutor’s numerous attempts to
confuse the evidence and distort the applicable law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT CONVICTIONS
UNDER AN EXTORTION THEORY.
The charges involving Callies, Burke, Harville, and Sandberg were
submitted to the jury under the theories of extortion outlined in UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-406 (2)(b) and (2)(g), to-wit: that Hummel had threatened to “[s]ubject the person
threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint” or had threatened to
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“[t]ake action as an official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or
cause such action or withholding.” See Jury Instruction No. 7; R 299.
The State’s extortion theory was based upon the assumption that Hummel
had been appointed to represent the alleged victims. The State had initially contended
that Hummel had been appointed to represent these individuals and had “threatened to act
in a less effective manner” unless he was retained privately. R 110, 466-477. The State
further contended that public defenders “act in an official capacity” and “receive their
power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the
County. . . .” R 105-106.

Callies. Prior to trial, the State’s theory of how Hummel had threatened Callies was
premised upon the assumption that Hummel had been appointed to represent Callies and
had threatened Callies by telling him that if he did not retain Hummel privately Callies
“would spend an additional thirty (30) days in jail and several additional felony charges
would be filed against Mr. Callies.” R 107-108, 466-467.
At trial, it became clear that Judge Lee had not appointed Hummel to
represent Callies. R 461, at 166-186; R 463, at 59-62. Moreover, it became apparent that
Hummel had not threatened to withhold services which he was obliged to render Callies
as it clearly appeared that Callies did not qualify for court-appointed counsel. R 463, at
103-104; State’s Exhibit 20. Indeed, up until the time when Callies took the witness
stand at trial and testified that he had mistakenly overreported his income, there was no
reason for Hummel or County Attorney Huntington to conclude that Callies was eligible
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for court-appointed counsel. R 463, at 103-105. It is clear from the record that Hummel
was not responsible for any distortion of Callies’ eligibility for court-appointed counsel.
R 461, at 103-104.
The State presented no evidence that Hummel had threatened that he would
physically confine or restrain Callies or that he would cause someone else to confine or
restrain Callies if he did not retain Hummel privately. Informing Callies that, unless he
was able to reach some agreement with the county attorney, he would spend another
month in jail was not a threat that Hummel would physically confine Callies, nor was it a
threat that he would cause someone else to confine or restrain him. It was an accurate
assessment of Callies’s legal situation. R 463, at 66-67.
Notwithstanding the fact that it was by then clear that Hummel had not been
appointed to represent Callies, the case was submitted to the jury on the theory that
Hummel had stolen a firearm from Callies by threatening him. See Instruction No. 8; R
300. This theory was clearly a vestige of the State’s earlier mistaken belief that Hummel
had been appointed to represent Callies and had refused to provide services unless he was
retained.
While the prosecutor elicited testimony from County Attorney Huntington
attempting to suggest that, notwithstanding Huntington’s recommendation, Judge Lee had
in fact appointed Hummel to represent Callies (R 463, at 105-106), surely the State will
have to concede that the record demonstrates that Hummel was never appointed to
represent Callies. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the Callies minute entry was
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evidence upon which the jury could have based a finding that Hummel had actually been
appointed to represent Callies, there is no evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that Hummel was or could have been aware that Callies qualified for the
services of the public defender, nor is there any evidence that Hummel was or could have
been aware that Judge Lee had appointed him to represent Callies.

Burke. Prior to trial, the State summarized its theory of how Hummel had threatened
Burke as follows:
Mr. Hummel’s exercise of control over the property of Mr.
Burke was done by extortion when Mr. Hummel acted within
his office as Garfield County Public Defender to represent
Mr. Burke and threatened to act in a less effective manner
(withhold official action) unless Mr. Burke pay for his legal
representation. Mr. Hummel acted as an official and forced
Mr. Burke to pay him for his legal representation, even when
Mr. Burke felt he had been appointed a public defender free
of cost.
R 110 (citations omitted).
At trial, it became clear that Hummel was never appointed to represent
Burke in the state court proceedings. R 461, at 246-252; ADDENDUM D. In an attempt to
advance the State’s contention that Hummel had “threatened to act in a less effective
manner (withhold official action) unless Mr. Burke pay for his legal representation” (R
110), the prosecutor elicited testimony from Burke that Hummel had told Burke that “he
could better represent me if we hired him” and said, “You know how courts are about
public defenders?” R 461, at 220.
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We must assume that the jury believed every word of Burke’s testimony.
Moreover, perhaps the jury construed these statements as a misrepresentation or, at least,
a suggestion that persons who are represented by appointed counsel are at some
disadvantage as a result of a bad judicial attitude toward public defenders. Accordingly,
we will hereafter discuss the materiality of this evidence in the context of Theft by
Deception. See POINT II, infra. However, in the context of an extortion theory, it is clear
that these statements cannot reasonably be construed as a threat to withhold official
action, nor were they a threat to subject Burke or anyone else to physical confinement or
restraint.

Harville and Sandberg.
No Evidence of Threat. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued
that the evidence established that Hummel had threatened Harville and Sandberg with
federal firearm charges if they did not retain him privately. R 458, at 237-239, 241. In
fact, Harville testified that Hummel told him: “I should probably sign over my firearms
to him so that -- as a retainer, so that way I wouldn’t be able to face further charges.” R
460, at 29. He further testified that Hummel told him: “If I maintained possession of the
firearms, that I could face additional federal charges” and that “if I signed over the
firearms, then that would eliminate and take that out of play.” R 460, at 37.
The State presented no evidence indicating that Hummel had threatened
Harville with federal charges if he did not retain Hummel privately. Moreover, there is
no evidence indicating that Hummel had suggested that Harville might be subject to
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federal firearms charges for the same actions that had resulted in his state firearms
prosecution. Indeed, it is obvious that Harville understood that Hummel was advising
him of the possibility future legal entanglements “[i]f [he] maintained possession of the
firearms.” R 460, at 37, emphasis added.
It is a federal felony for any person who has been convicted in any court of
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or who is an unlawful
user of any controlled substance to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or to
receive any firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 922(g)(3). Possession of a Firearm by
Restricted Person, the offense with which Harville was charged and to which he pled
guilty, is a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(a). It would have been malpractice under these circumstances
for Hummel to fail to advise Harville of the potential consequences associated with
“maintaining” possession of firearms.
Harville testified that Hummel told him and Sandberg that they would be
“better off” and it would “look better” for them if they retained Hummel and that they
would have a “better chance” of getting out of jail that day. R 460, at 24-25. Sandberg
testified that Hummel “said that he could pretty well guarantee that we could get out that
day if we hired him as a private attorney versus being a public defender” and that “he
wasn’t sure what kind of deal he could make” as a public defender. R 462, at 116.
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These statements cannot reasonably be construed as threats to the effect that
Hummel would physically confine or restrain Harville or Sandberg or that he would cause
someone else to confine or restrain them unless they retained him privately. Moreover,
they cannot reasonably be construed as threats to “withhold official action.” We will
hereafter discuss the materiality of this evidence in the context of Theft by Deception.
See POINT II, infra.
No Evidence That Harville Was Deprived of Any Property. Theft by
Extortion requires proof that the accused “obtain[ed] or exercise[d] control over the
property of another by extortion and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.” See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-406(1). COUNT 1 was sent to the jury on the theory that the
Defendant “acted with the purpose to deprive Mr. Harville of his property.” See Jury
Instruction No. 3; R 295.
The firearms that Harville signed over to Hummel were the weapons he had
in his possession when he was charged with being a restricted person in possession of a
firearm. R 461, at 15-17; State’s Exhibit 3. They were seized as evidence of the crime
for which he was arrested. R 461, at 19-23. Harville had no legally enforceable interest
in these firearms. He forfeited his interest in them when he was convicted of having used
the weapons in the commission of a public offense.
Section 76-10-525 of the Utah Code states:
All police departments and/or sheriff’s departments which
have in their possession a weapon after it has been used for
court purposes shall determine the true owner of the weapon
and return it to him; however, if unable to determine the true
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owner of the weapon, or if the true owner is the person
committing the crime for which the weapon was used as
evidence, the department shall confiscate it and it shall revert
to that agency for their use and/or disposal as the head of the
department determines.
A law enforcement agency that has legal possession of a firearm that has
been seized as evidence in a criminal matter “shall confiscate” the weapon after it is no
longer required for court purposes “if the true owner is the person committing the crime
for which the weapon was used as evidence.” Ownership of the firearm automatically
“revert[s] to that agency for their use and/or disposal” without the necessity of initiating
forfeiture proceedings pursuant to Title 24 of the Utah Code. Hummel could not have
acted “with a purpose to deprive [Harville] thereof,” as it was apparent that Harville’s
interest in these firearms was forfeit.2
The piece of paper which was used to create Harville’s promissory note had
little if any intrinsic value. It could only be deemed to have any real value to the extent
the parties to the note considered it to be evidence of indebtedness and a legally
enforceable instrument. The State’s own evidence clearly indicates that Harville
understood that Hummel would not enforce the note and, indeed, Hummel did nothing

2

During the trial, Harville claimed that the firearms he had signed over to Hummel actually
belonged to his father, although he never claimed to have disclosed this to Hummel. R 461,
at 204. If, indeed, these firearms had belonged to a third party who had not been involved
in the commission of the offense in which they had been used, by directive of Section
76-10-525, “the true owner of the weapon” would have been entitled to its return “after it has
been used for court purposes.” Even if it could now be said to appear that Harville’s father
was the owner of these firearms, there is no evidence that Hummel had any reason to believe
that some third party had a legal interest in the firearms.
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that suggests that he considered the note to be evidence of indebtedness or otherwise
treated it as a legally enforceable instrument.
There is no evidence that Hummel acted with a “purpose to deprive”
Harville of his interest in any property.
No Evidence of “Purpose to Deprive” Sandberg of $5,000. Sandberg
explained that he and Harville retained Hummel “in the interim” and signed a promissory
note “in order to make it seem as though we had retained him as private counsel.” R 462,
at 117. Harville and Sandberg both testified that Hummel had assured them from the
outset that he would not demand payment of the promissory notes, nor send the notes to
collection. R 460, at 31; R 462, at 117. Harville and Sandberg both testified that in fact
Hummel had never done anything to enforce any promissory note signed by Harville or
Sandberg. R 462, at 92, 154.
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Hummel wanted to
secure an interest in Sandberg’s shares of stock in Sandberg Ranch, Inc. R 458, at 242.
He further told the jury that although Hummel told Harville and Sandberg that he would
never collect or enforce the promissory note, “the problem with that” is:
“But what if [Sandberg] ever sold [his stock in Sandberg Ranch, Inc.]? All of a sudden
Mr. Hummel now, the defendant, has this interest.” R 458, at 242-243. The district court
sustained counsel’s objection to this line of argument noting: “There wasn’t evidence of
a lien.” R 458, at 243. At that point, the prosecutor seems to abandon the theory relating
to the promissory note.
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[BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] He has this promissory
note that he can -- can look to try and enforce. Okay? Why
enforce it when they don’t have any money? I mean, what -what good does it do to enforce a promissory note when you
know they don’t have a -- have any way to satisfy it? So he
told them he -- that he would not -- he would not pursue it.
But he did get the guns. We know that. And this testimony is
-- is undisputed, that he did obtain the guns.
R 458, at 243-244.
While there was no evidence that Hummel ever attempted or intended to
enforce Sandberg’s promissory note, COUNT 5 was sent to the jury on the theory that
Hummel had, by such means, attempted to steal $5,000 from Sandberg. See Jury
Instruction No. 11; R 303.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT CONVICTIONS
UNDER A DECEPTION THEORY.
Callies. Prior to trial, the State summarized its theory of how Hummel had deceived
Callies as follows:
Mr. Hummel’s exercise of control over the property of Mr.
Callies was done by deception when the Sixth District Court
found Mr. Callies indigent and appointed Mr. Hummel to
represent Mr. Callies free of charge as a public defender and
Mr. Hummel intimidated Mr. Callies into paying him firearms
for legal services threatening if Mr. Callies did not retain him
privately, by paying him firearms for legal services, Mr.
Callies would spend an additionally thirty (30) days in jail and
several felony charges would be filed against him.
R 99 (citations omitted).

33

During the trial, it became apparent that Callies’ application for courtappointed counsel, on its face, indicated that he was not indigent. The county attorney
himself had concluded that Callies should not be appointed a public defender. Indeed, the
conclusion was inescapable given the content of Callies’ application. See State’s Exhibit
20. The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the Defendant was never
appointed to represent Mr. Callies.
Judge Lee was not comfortable in deciding any contested issue in Callies’
case and it was apparent that, unless Callies was able to negotiate some kind of a
resolution with the State, he would in all likelihood remain in jail until Judge Mower
conducted court some 28 days later. Hummel was under no obligation to represent Mr.
Callies. If Callies wanted the assistance of counsel in negotiating a stipulated resolution
on August 7, 2008, he was going to have to make arrangements with someone. Even if
Hummel told Callies that he would not assist Callies in attempting to resolve his legal
problem unless he was retained, this is not evidence of deception.
The State further contends that Hummel deceived Callies by telling him that
if he did not retain Hummel privately “several felony charges would be filed against
him.” R 99. The following is Callies’ testimony regarding this alleged deception:
Q. [BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] Mr. Callies, we
were just talking about -- you had just stated that he had told
you that the -- that the police wanted to put more charges on
you. And you said he told you something else. What was that
something else?
A. [BY MR. CALLIES] He told me that if I pled guilty, that
I would not get no felonies. That if I was going to work to get
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my children back, that I would have to plead guilty. I had no
hope of ever getting my children back if I did not plead guilty,
that he would make sure. And that’s what -- he would make
sure that, you know, I would get no felonies so I can receive
my children back.
Q. Okay.
A. And he was real persistent on me pleading guilty to this.
It was part of me getting out of jail that day. Also, to go back
to work to take care of my company.
R 461, at 99-100.
Even if we assume that the statements attributed to Hummel are false or
misleading, they had nothing to do with Callies retaining Hummel or the agreement to
give Hummel the SKS rifle. These so-called misrepresentations were purportedly made
in order to induce Callies to plead guilty, not for the purpose of obtaining or exercising
control over Callies’ property.

Burke. Prior to trial, the State summarized its theory of how Hummel deceived Burke as
follows:
Mr. Hummel’s exercise of control over the property of Mr.
Burke was done by deception when Mr. Burke was found
indigent by the Sixth District Court, who appointed Mr.
Hummel to represent Mr. Burke, and when Mr. Hummel
deceived Mr. Burke into paying him for legal services
rendered by indicating Mr. Hummel could represent Mr.
Burke better if he hired Mr. Hummel privately than if Mr.
Hummel represented Mr. Burke as a public defender.
R 100 (citations omitted).
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The evidence presented at trial clearly established that Hummel was never
appointed to represent Burke in the state court proceedings. Moreover, the evidence
clearly indicates that Hummel was privately retained in large part because Burke was
facing the real possibility of prosecution in the federal system and that, in agreeing to
represent Burke in any proceeding initiated in the federal court, Hummel had undertaken
an obligation over and above any duty he had assumed by contracting to be the Garfield
County public defender.
The State offered the following in support of its contention that Hummel
had deceived Burke:
Q. [BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] What did he say?
A. [BY MR. BURKE] That he could better represent me if
we hired him.
Q. And did he say anything else about that?
A. That, “You know how courts are about public defenders?”
And I said, “Yeah. I know how public defenders are.
They work for them -- the courts.”
So you know, I figured -- you know -- you know, he
wanted to get us to hire him. So we hired him.
***
Q. Okay. Now back to that discussion about the -- the public
defender. He had told you that he could represent you better
if -- if you -- or if you retained him privately?
A. Right. He --
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Q. And then you made a comment about public defenders. I
-- I want to understand what you -- what you were thinking
and what -- how come you made a comment. What -A. Well, you know, I’ve never been a good -- good kid. So
I’ve had a few public defenders in my life. And it’s -- you
know, I mean, it’s just -- you don’t get a good outcome with
them, basically, I figured.
Q. That’s in your experience?
A. That’s been in my experience, yes.
Q. Okay. And so you agreed with Mr. Hummel then that he
could represent you better if you retained him -A. Well, my dad agreed. I mean -- I mean, I -- I didn’t have
no money. So my dad agreed to it.
Q. Oh. Your dad agreed to the arrangement?
A. Yes.
R 461, at 222-223.
Burke was the target of a federal investigation arising out of the same
criminal episode that provided the basis of the state charges. Representation by the same
attorney in the state and federal matters would optimize the coordination of the matters,
facilitate a comprehensive resolution, and minimize the risk of multiple convictions and
the risk of the imposition of cumulative penalties in our system of duel sovereignties.
Such representation clearly could reasonably be characterized as “better.”
Deception occurs when a person intentionally creates or confirms an
impression that is false and “that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction.” See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-637

401(5)(a). Even if we factor out the interplay of the parallel federal investigation, it is
apparent that Burke clearly had his own ideas about public defenders based upon his own
experience.

Harville and Sandberg. Theft by Deception, like Theft by Extortion, requires proof that
the accused obtained or exercised control over “the property of another” and that he did
so with a “purpose to deprive” the other person of the property. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-405(1)(2008).
No Evidence of “Purpose to Deprive” Alleged Victims of $5,000. Proof of
a “purpose to deprive” requires evidence that, in taking possession of the promissory
notes in question, it was Hummel’s conscious objective to permanently deprive Harville
and/or Sandberg of something valued at $5,000. Harville and Sandberg both testified that
Hummel had assured them that he would not enforce the notes. R 460, at 31; R 462, at
117. They both testified that in fact Hummel never did anything to enforce either of the
notes. R 462, at 92, 154. There is no evidence that Hummel intended to use the note as
vehicles for obtaining anything of value from Harville or Sandberg. Moreover, the notes
themselves had no intrinsic value to Harville or Sandberg or to any third party.
No Evidence That Harville Was Deprived of Any Property. COUNT 1 was
sent to the jury on the theory that Hummel “acted with the purpose to deprive Mr.
Harville of his property.” See Jury Instruction No. 3; R 295. The firearms that Harville
signed over to Hummel were the weapons that had provided the basis of his being
charged as a restricted person in possession of a firearm. R 461, at 15-17; State’s Exhibit
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3. They were seized as evidence at the time of his arrest. R 461, at 19-23. Harville had
no legally enforceable interest in these firearms. Harville forfeited his interest when he
was convicted of having possessed these weapons in violation of law. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-525.
Insufficiency of Evidence of Deception. Deception must be of a character
that is likely to affect the judgment of the alleged victim. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6401(5)(a). Harville and Sandberg testified that Hummel told them that it would “look
better” for them if they retained counsel. R 460, at 24-25; R 462, at 116. Harville
testified:
Q. [BY THE STATE’S PROSECUTOR] Did you think that
it was going to look better to the court if -- if you retained a
private attorney as opposed to having a public defender?
A. [BY MR. HARVILLE] Yeah. I think I -- I believed that.
The way he told me about it, yes, I believed that would have
been better.
Q. Did you believe that because he told you that or did you
believe that from your own experience?
A. Well, from my own experience, in hindsight, I -- I had a
feeling a public defender -- well, coming from California,
public defenders are -- are rush -- rush lawyers. They push -they’re just assigned immediately for you and then they just
go through the paperwork, the motions and then they push
you out.
A person who has a private lawyer has a better chance of
looking like they -- have a better chance of defending against
charges.
R 460, at 32.
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Spencer. Prior to trial, the State summarized its theory of how Hummel deceived
Spencer as follows:
Mr. Hummel’s exercise of control over the property of Mr.
Spencer was done by deception when Mr. Spencer was found
indigent by the Sixth District Court who appointed Mr.
Hummel to represent Mr. Spencer, and Mr. Hummel
defrauded Mr. Spencer into paying him with firearms for legal
services rendered when Mr. Hummel was appointed as a
public defender and was to represent Mr. Spencer free of
charge.
R 99-100.
At trial, it became apparent that Hummel had not been appointed to
represent Spencer. Spencer requested a public defender. R 462, at 41. Judge Lee gave
him an application for a court-appointed attorney and instructed him to talk to Mr.
Hummel. R 462, at 42-43. While talking to Spencer, Hummel asked if he had “any
collateral for private counsel.” R 462, at 43, 58. Spencer said he had “a couple guns.” R
462, at 43. Hummel agreed to represent him in exchange for three firearms which
Spencer had not disclosed in his indigency affidavit. R 52, at 88; R 462, at 44.
COUNT 3 was sent to the jury only on the theory of Theft by Deception as
the district court agreed that there was no evidence of any statement that could have been
construed as a threat. Jury Instruction No. 9; R 301. Asking Spencer if he had any
property that could be used to retain an attorney was the apparent extent of the
Defendant’s “deception.” Spencer offered no testimony regarding any discussion with
Hummel concerning the pros or cons of privately retaining Hummel , nor did he identify
any statement that Hummel allegedly made that was false. R 462, at 48.
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POINT III
IN AGREEING TO REPRESENT BURKE IN THE
FEDERAL MATTER, HUMMEL UNDERTOOK AN
OBLIGATION OVER AND ABOVE ANY DUTY HE HAD
ASSUMED BY CONTRACTING WITH GARFIELD
COUNTY.
The evidence clearly indicates that Hummel was privately retained in large
part because Burke was facing the real possibility of prosecution in the federal system for
the same conduct that provided the basis for the charges in the state court. R 461, at 255256; R 458, at 33. The State presented no evidence suggesting that Hummel had any duty
under his contract with Garfield County to represent Burke in any federal investigation or
judicial proceeding. Moreover, the State presented no evidence suggesting that Hummel
was prohibited by the terms of his contract with Garfield County from contracting to
privately represent persons in federal matters.
Even if Hummel had been appointed to represent Burke in the state
prosecution, he still would have had no duty under his contract with Garfield County to
represent Burke in any federal investigation or judicial proceeding and he was free to
contract to privately represent Burke in the federal matter. Inasmuch as it is undisputed
that Burke agreed to pay Hummel the $2,500 in question in connection with Hummel’s
agreement to counsel Burke and assist him in the course of the federal investigation and,
if needs be, to represent him in the federal court, the evidence will not support the
conclusion that Hummel stole $2,500 from Burke.
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POINT IV
BOTH THEORIES ADVANCED BY THE STATE ARE
PREDICATED UPON THE ALLEGED VICTIMS’
ELIGIBILITY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL.
Hummel, like every other criminal defense attorney who has submitted a
bid to provide legal representation for the indigent is entitled to rely upon established
rules of law in assessing the magnitude of the task he is agreeing to undertake. The
indigency guidelines are found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202.
Subsection 77-32-202(3)(a) of the Utah Code states:
“Indigency” means that a person:
(i) does not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other
means to provide for the payment of legal counsel and all
other necessary expenses of representation without depriving
that person or the family of that person of food, shelter,
clothing, and other necessities; or
(ii) has an income level at or below 150% of the United
States poverty level as defined by the most recently revised
poverty income guidelines published by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services; and
(iii) has not transferred or otherwise disposed of any assets
since the commission of the offense with the intent of
establishing eligibility for the appointment of counsel under
this chapter.
Subsection 77-32-202(3)(b) states that the indigency determination involves
consideration of the probable expense of defending the case, the applicant’s “ownership
of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible personal property or real property, or
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reasonable expectancy of any such interest,” and the applicant’s financial needs and
obligations.
A criminal defendant seeking appointed counsel is required to file with the
court a “fully complete affidavit” containing information relevant to a determination of
his claimed indigency and any person who intentionally or knowingly omits a material
fact in such an affidavit is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§
77-32-202(2)(a) and (6)(d).
The State’s evidence indicated that Hummel, as counsel for the indigent,
represented “at least” 75 percent of the criminal defendants who were charged in the
district court in Garfield County. R 463, at 86-87. However, he was never appointed to
represent Callies, Burke, Harville, Sandberg, or Spencer. While the State would
ultimately take the position that these individuals had been eligible for appointed counsel
and that Hummel’s misconduct lay in avoiding his appointment by manipulation of the
system, it is not clear that any of them qualified for the appointment of counsel.3
The affidavit which Callies filed with the court clearly indicated that he
would not qualify for court-appointed counsel. See State’s Exhibit 20.
The charges against Harville and Sandberg did not involve complex legal or
factual issues. It was apparent from the beginning that the probable expense of defending

3

No discussion of Burke’s and Spencer’s financial eligibility for court-appointed counsel
is included here because it is apparent that in agreeing to represent Burke in the federal
matter, Hummel undertook an obligation over and above any duty he had assumed by
contracting with Garfield County (see POINT III, p. 41, supra) and there is clearly no
evidence that Hummel made any misrepresentation to Spencer (see POINT II, p. 40, supra).
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the case would be relatively minor. While Harville and Sandberg had a combined annual
income of less than $10,000, Sandberg possessed an asset valued at $160,000 which he
had failed to disclose in his indigency affidavit. Moreover, it is apparent that Harville and
Sandberg were able to retain private counsel “without depriving that person or the family
of that person of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities.” See UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-32-202(3)(a)(I).
Clearly, nothing Hummel is accused of having said to Callies, Harville, or
Sandberg could reasonably be characterized as a “threat” as it is apparent that these
individuals were not eligible for the services of court-appointed counsel. Furthermore, no
comment that Hummel allegedly made about the quality of the legal representation by a
public defender can be considered a material misrepresentation if the person to whom the
statement was allegedly made was not eligible for the services of appointed counsel.

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING
THE JURY TO UNANIMOUSLY AGREE ON A VERDICT
WITH RESPECT TO COUNTS 1, 2, 4, AND 5.
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution states: “In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous.” This requirement is not met if a jury unanimously finds only
that a defendant is guilty of a crime. “Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific
crime and as to each element of the crime.” State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶60, 992
P.2d 951, 966 (emphasis added). While Theft by Deception, as defined in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-405, and Theft by Extortion, as defined in Section 76-6-406, are both theft
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offenses, they contain distinct elements. The former requires proof of some kind of
deception as an element of the offense and the latter requires proof of some kind of threat
as an element of the offense.
Jury Instruction Nos. 13 and 34 advised the jury that it must be unanimous
on the question of whether the Defendant was guilty of Theft or Attempted Theft, but the
court, over Defendant’s objection, refused to instruct the jurors that they must be
unanimous as to each element of the crime. R 305, 327; R 458, at 129-133. In other
words, the jury was instructed that it could convict even in the absence of unanimous
agreement “on which alternative elements of an offense were committed as long as they
agree[d] with the ultimate conclusion that the defendant [wa]s guilty.” 1999 UT 59, ¶63,
992 P.2d at 967. Clearly, this was error.

POINT VI
THE VERDICTS ON COUNTS 1, 2, 4, AND 5 CANNOT
STAND UNLESS THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A
CONVICTION ON BOTH ALTERNATE THEORIES.
Even if we assume that there was no error in allowing the jury to return
guilty verdicts on the charges involving Callies, Burke, Harville, and Sandberg without
requiring them to unanimously agree on the alternative theories and elements advanced by
the State, it is clear that in order to sustain a verdict rendered under such circumstances
the evidence must support a verdict under both of the alternative theories. See United
States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d
311, 325 (2d Cir.1975); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir.1963);
45

James v. People, 727 P.2d 850, 853 (Colo.1986); Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d
615, 617 (Ky.1980); Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 664 N.E.2d 833, 837
(1996); State v. Olsson, 56 Mich.App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1974); Fife v. State,
676 P.2d 565, 568-69 (Wyo.1984).
Even in those jurisdictions where jurors have not been required to
unanimously agree on a single alternative method of the commission of the crime, it is
still held that each alternative advanced by the prosecution must be supported by
sufficient proof to sustain a conviction. E.g., State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501,
508 (1980); State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981); State v. Timley, 255
Kan. 286, 875 P.2d 242 (1994). Accordingly, even if the court were to conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty under a theory of deception, the
verdict cannot stand if the evidence was not also sufficient to support a verdict of guilty
under a theory of extortion and vice versa.

POINT VII
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE
STATE’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE PURPORTED
MISCONDUCT IT WOULD ULTIMATELY RELY UPON
IN PROCURING DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION.
Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution guarantees: “In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him [and] to have a copy thereof.” In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208
(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court explained that this provision requires “that the
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accused be given sufficient information ‘so that he can know the particulars of the alleged
wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his defense.’” Id. at 1214 (quoting State v.
Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985)). See also, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 103-04
(Utah 1988).
In the instant case, the State’s theory of Defendant’s “wrongful conduct”
was in a state of flux throughout the entire proceedings, including the trial. Initially, the
State contended that Hummel had been appointed to represent the alleged victims as the
public defender and had refused to provide adequate representation unless the victims
agreed to retain him privately. See R 466-477. When, in the course of the trial, it became
apparent that Hummel had not been appointed to represent any of the alleged victims, the
State’s theories of Hummel’s alleged wrongdoing began to morph.
The first shift in the State’s theory of Hummel’s wrongdoing involved the
introduction of Callies’ contention that Exhibit 20 was not the application that he had
initially filled out and the elicitation of testimony to the effect that Callies had overreported his income on Exhibit 20 “[b]ecause I had Mr. Hummel sitting right next to me
pressuring me.” R 461, at 103-104. Hummel was never provided fair notice that the
State would contend that Hummel was guilty of wrongdoing in purportedly having Callies
prepare a second application and in confusing Callies so that he would, on the second
application, overreport his income so as to make it appear that Callies did not qualify for
appointed counsel.
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When defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony concerning at what
point in time the State had become aware of these newly disclosed allegations, the State’s
prosecutor asked for “some leeway” in the allegations of wrongdoing that the State would
be permitted to advance, telling the court that “in essence” he was as surprised by Callies’
testimony as was defense counsel. The prosecutor went on to explain that while Callies
had previously mentioned “this idea of filling out a separate application,” the State had
never followed up on it because the prosecutor “thought he was confused.” R 461, at
141-142. Clearly, Callies was confused. Nevertheless, the State’s prosecutor was
allowed to advance this previously undisclosed theory of Hummel’s purported
wrongdoing. In closing argument, the prosecutor advanced the theory that Hummel had
manipulated Callies and the legal system, arguing: “There was some discussion of two
applications that were filed -- or filled out, not filed.” R 458, at 248. Callies “was
confused” because “Mr. Hummel was over him talking.” Id. “[A]nd then he ends up,
you know, on the record, Mr. Hummel ends up saying he’s -- he’s been retained by Jerry
Callies. . . .” Id.
The most consequential and comprehensive shift in the State’s theory of
Hummel’s wrongful conduct did not occur until the court was preparing to instruct the
jury and, on its own initiative, drafted Instruction No. 18 which, in substance and effect,
advised the jury that the alleged victims were indigent and entitled to appointed counsel if
their income fell at or below 150% of the United States poverty level, regardless of the
extent of their other assets or the probable cost of retaining counsel. R 310-311. In
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drafting this instruction, the court sua sponte took judicial notice of the poverty income
guidelines for 2008 and 2009 and included these guidelines in the jury instruction. Id.
While it did track the language of the statute, defense counsel objected to
Instruction No. 18 on the grounds that it was misleading because, under the language of
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(a)(i), a determination of indigency required an
examination of not only the applicant’s income, but his other assets, credit, or other
means to provide for the payment of legal counsel. R 458, at 149-150. The district court
conceded that the result was “bizarre” because the first and third subsections of the statute
speaks in terms of “weighing assets and things that are available” and “what you take into
account” in determining indigency, but “[t]he second subsection says, ‘If you beat the -- if
you’re below the 150 [percent], that’s it.’” R 458, at 150. Referring to this statutory
language, the court added: “I don’t know how I fix that.” Id. Defendant’s objection to
the instruction was overruled. R 310-311; R 458, at 149-150.
At this point it became apparent that the State would not be required to
prove that Hummel had been appointed to represent the alleged victims. Moreover, it was
now apparent that the State could argue that the alleged victims had the right to
Defendant’s services free of charge without regards to the complexity of their cases or the
extent of their assets and that Hummel was guilty of wrongful conduct in leading the
alleged victims to think otherwise. R 458, at 239, 242, 245-248, 251-258, 260, 264, 306307, 310.

49

In an effort to address the theories the State had advanced at the preliminary
hearing and throughout the pretrial proceedings, Hummel had spent virtually the entire
trial attempting to demonstrate that he had not been appointed to represent any of the
alleged victims. Hummel’s alleged appointment and his purported threats to withhold the
legal services he had been appointed to provide were, in the final analysis, red herrings.
It is clear that Hummel was not “given sufficient information ‘so that he [could] know the
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and [could] adequately prepare his defense’”
because the nature of his alleged misconduct was constantly changing up until the time
when the court was putting the finishing touches on the jury instructions.

POINT VIII
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BY THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCONDUCT.
Use of False Sworn Statements to Procure Bindover. In the instant case, the
prosecutor procured the order requiring Hummel to answer felony charges by means of
the written hearsay statements which the State introduced as evidence at the preliminary
hearing pursuant to Utah R.Evid. 1102(b)(8)(B). Each of these out-of-court statements
contained false statements concerning Hummel’s purported appointment as counsel for
the indigent. The prosecutor could have determined that four of these five statements
were false by simply consulting the district court’s files.

Repeated Attempts to Create False Impressions of Fact and Law. After it had
become clear that Judge Lee had never appointed Hummel to represent Callies (R 461, at
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166-186; R 463, at 59-62), the State’s prosecutor persisted in an attempt to suggest to the
jury that Hummel had actually been appointed by having County Attorney Huntington
read an erroneous minute entry into the record and than asking Huntington “so would this
be an instance where you made one recommendation and the Court apparently went a
different direction?” R 463, at 105-106.
The prosecutor still persisted in closing argument. After defense counsel’s
argument, the prosecutor responded with:
And -- and for -- for counsel to say that Mr. Callies was never
appointed a public defender, I’m not sure that’s entirely
accurate. The court docket says he was appointed a public
defender and the public defender was Mr. Hummel.
And there was no audio on that. But, again, does it matter?
R 458, at 307.
The prosecutor’s entire closing argument was calculated to confuse and
mislead the jury. The State clearly crossed the line with the following argument:
But if you’ll recall, the testimony was that the defendant told
Harville -- let’s see, Harville that he could face federal
charges -- federal firearm charges if he didn’t get rid of his
guns. Yet Mr. Huntington stated that he never did refer that
case to the -- for the feds to screen.
So the threats is this pattern of manipulation that’s prevalent
throughout all of these defendants, all of the individuals who
testified in court.
R 458, at 238.
This argument was clearly designed to lead the jury to believe that it was
criminal for Hummel to advise Harville, who was about to plead guilty to the state felony,
51

that “he could face federal . . . firearm charges if he didn’t get rid of his guns.” The
argument falsely suggests that Harville would suffer no firearms restriction as a result of
his conviction because County Attorney Huntington had not referred Harville’s case to
federal authorities for screening. R 458, at 238. “Their case was never referred to -- to
the feds for prosecution. So that was a -- that was a veiled threat.” R 458, at 241.
The prosecutor’s argument suggested that Burke and Harville had been
reluctant to go with a public defender because Hummel had indoctrinated them. R 458, at
264-265. In fact, Burke and Harville both clearly identified the fact that their low
opinions of public defenders were the product of personal experience each had had in the
courts of other states. See R 460, at 32; R 461, at 222-223.
In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that Harville had not forfeited his
interest in the firearms he had possessed in violation of the law and that Harville could
have reclaimed the weapons once he had completed the conditions of his probation and
filed for the reduction that Hummel had negotiated in the grade of Harville’s offense. R
458, at 305-306. It is obvious that the prosecutor knew that this was a distortion of the
law. At sentencing, the court ordered Hummel to return the firearms to the sheriff’s
office and then directed the sheriff’s office “to return those to the victims from whom
they came.” R 465, at 29. In preparing the written judgment and sentence for the court’s
signature, the State’s prosecutor, on his own initiative, changed the directive to require
the firearms “to be disposed of pursuant to the Garfield County Sheriff’s policies and
Utah law.” R 449. Having procured a conviction on the theory that Hummel had
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deprived Harville of his property, the prosecutor turned his attention to correcting the
court’s written order by requiring that the weapons be disposed of in accordance with
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-525, which requires the forfeiture of any weapon that the
owner thereof has used in violation of the criminal law.
Concerning Hummel’s alleged attempt to steal $5000 from Sandberg, the
prosecutor told the jury that Hummel wanted to secure an interest in Sandberg’s shares of
stock in Sandberg Ranch, Inc. R 458, at 242. Noting that although Hummel had told
Harville and Sandberg that he would never collect or enforce the promissory note, the
prosecutor explained “the problem with that”: “But what if [Sandberg] ever sold [his
stock in Sandberg Ranch, Inc.]? All of a sudden Mr. Hummel now, the defendant, has
this interest.” R 458, at 242-243. This was a distortion of the law and the evidence.
A prosecutor who introduces evidence which he or she knows or has reason
to know is false is guilty of misconduct. See State v. Doyle, 245 P.3d 206, 2010 UT App
351 (Utah App. 2010). A prosecutor’s statements in argument are improper and
constitute error if they call to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified
in considering in reaching a verdict. They require reversal if they are harmful. See State
v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). Misconduct constitutes plain error when it
unfairly prejudices the accused’s ability to obtain a fair trial. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT
89, ¶ 54, 174 P.3d 628, 639 (stating in plain error context that “[i]f prosecutorial
misconduct is established, the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Defendant’s convictions must be reversed
because the evidence will not sustain the convictions. Moreover, the Defendant was
denied due process of law by reason of the State’s failure to identify the misconduct it
would ultimately rely upon in seeking Defendant’s conviction and by reason of the
prosecutor’s misconduct in using false evidence in procuring a bindover order and in
intentionally creating false impressions of law and fact.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of November, 2013.

__________________________________
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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